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The development literature has been investigating the determinants of foreign aid allocation for 
more than 30 years. Dudley & Montmarquette (1976) proposed a theoretical model that explains the 
supply of foreign aid by the donor countries' demand for foreign aid impact. Since then, numerous 
empirical studies examined the relationship between the recipient country’s needs, the donor 
country’s strategic and political interests and the amount of foreign aid given (e.g. Alesina & Dollar 
2000, Neumayer 2003, Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Hoeffler & Outram 2008).  
The lack of more detailed aid data constrained economic scholars to focus empirical research on the 
geographical allocation of the amount of aid. Hence, the majority of existing studies make the 
implicit assumption that all donors give the same type of aid and use the same channels or that all 
aid is motivated by the same reasons. The recent emergence of more eleborate aid datasets, both on 
national and international level, allowed reserachers to analyze the donor’s decision on the type of 
aid as well as the channel of aid. Thiele, Nunnenkamp & Dreher (2007) use sectorally 
disaggregated data in order to investigate whether foreign aid is allocated in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals. Neumayer (2005) finds that in contrast to general development aid 
the allocation of food aid is not dominated by strategic interests. Moreover, some papers have a 
closer look on aid allocation through private and multilateral channels in contrast to bilateral aid. 
Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele (2009) find that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) a) 
allocate more foreign aid to countries in need
1, b) do not prefer to work in difficult environments, c) 
act less autonomously than expected, d) choose locations in line with other NGOs and e) allocate 
more foreign aid to similiar countries. Furthermore, Dreher, Mölders & Nunnenkamp (2007) and 
Nunnenkamp, Weingarth & Weisser (2009) investigate the determinants of aid allocation by 
Swedish and Swiss NGOs, respectively and Dollar & Levin (2006) find that multilateral donors 
tend to act more in accordance with the motive of merit than bilateral donors. In contrast, 
Nunnenkamp & Öhler (2009) not only distinguish between private and official aid but also 3 
 
disaggregate aid figures for various official German aid channels in order to show that aid through 
different channels is not motivated for the same reasons. 
 
In line with the above mentioned literature, we argue that the analysis of foreign aid allocation is a 
necessary first step but not sufficient to derive implications about donor countries’ behavior. In 
order to get a more comprehensive picture of the motivation of donor countries’ incentives to 
provide aid, the decision on both the type and the channel of aid need to be considered. What 
criteria influence a donor country’s decision whether to assist by cash transfers or in-kind transfers? 
Why do countries pay bilateral aid to one country and multilateral aid to another? Our results 
suggest that the choice of the channel and type of aid is determined by four main motives: strategy, 
merit, transaction costs and need. This study relates to the literature on aid allocation by providing a 
positive analysis of the key drivers of the composition of aid but does not attempt to make a 
normative statement on the efficiency of specific channels or types of aid. 
The main purpose of this paper is threefold: First, we test if the key results from the aid allocation 
literature (i.e. the donor’s decision on the amount of aid) also apply to the donors’ decision on the 
composition of aid. Second, we identify additional variables that particularly drive the donors’ 
decision on the composition of aid. Third, the dataset allows us to distinguish between the 
behaviour of “traditional” donor countries (i.e. OECD countries) and “new” donor countries (i.e. 
non-OECD countries). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present the hypotheses 
for our analysis. Data and estimation strategy are presented in the third section. The fourth section 
concludes. 
 
2  The determinats of the channel and type of international disaster relief 
The existing literature on foreign aid has already identified some key determinants of the decision 
on the geographical allocation as well as the decision on the amount of the contribution. Further, 4 
 
Fink & Redaelli (2009) have included additional variables that drive the decision on post-disaster 
assistance in particular. We build up on these findings, discuss them in relation to the donors’ 
decision on the composition of aid in a post-disaster context and derive our hypotheses. In addition, 
we investigate factors that have received less attention in existing studies but might be important for 
the decision on the channel and type of aid.  
 
Humanitarian need 
The literature on foreign aid allocation usually measures a countries’ need using GDP per capita 
(GDP p.c.). However, in the case of natural disaster assistance, the need of a country is usually 
measured by the number of fatalities or the number of people being affected. Fink & Redaelli 
(2009) find that more catastrophic events in terms of fatalities and people affected attract more post-
disaster aid. Whereby the effect of the social magnitude on the amount of the contribution appears 
to be clear, the decision on the channel and type of aid is less obvious. The number of fatalities or 
people affected by a natural disaster is not only an indicator for the humanitarian need but also for 
the complexity of the “environment” the donor has to act in. Large-scale catastrophes leave areas 
without connection to the outside and it is hard for potential donors to receive information about the 
demands of the victims on the spot. In addition, natural disasters damage or even completely 
demolish the means necessary to distribute disaster relief (e.g. physical infrastructure such as roads) 
as well as to coordinate relief activity (e.g. telecommunication or local public administration). 
Multilateral agencies have a comparative adavantage over single countries in such difficult 
environments. They are more likely to get access to the key decision makers in the local 
governments and have access to a bigger pool of experts familiar with local language and customs 
as well as the affected area. Multilateral agencies also have a longer experience in dealing with the 
aftermath of large-scale catastrophes and they are less dependent on local infrastructure than the 
majority of individual donors (e.g. UN cargo planes). 
The relationship between the choice of the type of disaster assistance and humanitarian need is 5 
 
largely dependent on the context of the catastrophe. However, all else equal, it is reasonable to 
assume that disasters with a bigger social magnitude increase the burden on the recipient country. A 
higher level of fatalities or people affected raises the demand for rescue teams and emergency 
assistance specialists from other countries. The local suppply of safe drinking water, food, clothes 
and medicine might also be constrained and therefore increases the likelihood of in-kind transfers. 
Therefore we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Donors are more likely to deliver multilateral disaster assistance/in-kind assistance 




In accordance with Fink & Redaelli (2009) socioeconomic background entails the measures GDP 
p.c., population and population density. GDP p.c. does not only serve as protection against the 
effects of natural disasters (e.g. Kahn 2005, Anbarci et al. 2005), it also increases the country’s 
ability to cope with the aftermath of the disaster. Developed countries can easier absorb the adverse 
effects of natural catastrophes and return faster to business as usual. Larger countries could have 
more absorptive capacities as well as economies of scale
2 in dealing with post-disaster situations. 
Population density can increase the ex-ante chance of more fatalities due to higher concentration of 
potential victims; however more densely populated areas might have better social networks and find 
it easier to cope with the aftermath of a disaster (Fink & Redaelli 2009). Similar to the 
argumentation above, due to exceptional circumstances donors might prefer to assist via multilateral 
agencies in countries with low levels of GDP p.c. This might also be the case for larger countries, 
since individual donor countries are unlikely to know the regional differences in a large country as 
good as multinational agencies. However, the influence of population density on the choice of the 
channel of aid is ambiguos. On the one hand, natural disasters in densely populated regions might 6 
 
increase the risk of epidemics and other infectious diseases. Again, more difficult environments 
should increase the likelihood of multilateral disaster assistance. On the other hand, densely 
populated areas might be equipped with better catastrophe management tools and therefore not need 
the help of a multilateral agency but rather bilateral assistance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Donors are more likely to deliver multilateral disaster assistance if the recipient 
country is characterized by low levels of GDP p.c., large population and high population density. 
 
Merit 
In societies with weak institutions and governance transfers often do not reach their desired 
recipients and therefore fail to reach the goal of stabilization. This might be even more true for 
disaster assistance which is paid in case of emergencies where due to the exeptional circumstances 
minor attention is paid to the correct handling of the money received. The results of the literature on 
aid effectiveness are in line with World Bank study “Assessing Aid” (1998) which suggests that the 
impact of foreign aid is higher if the receiving country is in need and has good quality of 
institutions. Moreover, this study argues that in environments where the above mentioned 
conditions of strong institutions and policies are violated, bilateral assistance from one government 
to the other is unlikely to be successfull. In these circumstances a close cooperation with the 
affected society might circumvent the misuse of foreign assistance. Opposed to bilateral assistance, 
multilateral agencies might have better information about the risks in aid receiving countries and 
access to civil society. Moreover, since donor countries lack commitment power, Svensson (2000) 
argues that the delegation of aid to agencies which are less risk averse and have plausible 
commitment techniques could provide incentives in the receipient country to generate own effort. 
For this reason it seems plausibel when the UN-Millennium Project (2005) suggests to transfer 
money through NGOs in cases where the receipient country is characterized by weak institutions 
and policies.
3 Dollar & Levin (2006) show that multilateral assistance is more selective with respect 7 
 
to the motive of merit than bilateral aid. 
 
Apart from the channel of aid the type might also be relevant for the ability to achieve stabilization. 
Therefore, a broad strand of literature discusses the effectiveness of conditional transfers (e.g. tied 
aid and in-kind transfers) and cash transfers, respectively. Although some researchers view untied 
transfers as the most efficient (e.g. Cassen et al. 1986), restricted transfers, e.g. in-kind transfers, 
might be better suited for the reduction of misuse due to weak institutions and governance as well 
as efficient targeting since cash transfers are easier to embezzle than in-kind transfers (e.g. 
Amegashie et al. 2007). Moreover, the literature of the Samaritan’s Dilemma is closely related to 
the choice of the type of aid. The theoretical model of Coate (1995) suggests that in-kind transfers 
could circumvent the potential risk that recipients rely on relief to bail them out. Amegashie et al. 
(2007) investigate how donor countries' choice of the composition of cash and in-kind transfers 
adjusts to changes of governance (measured by political rights index and civil liberties index of 
Freedom House) in recipient countries. While multilateral donors reward (penalize) decreases 
(increases) in moral hazard behavior by reducing (rising) the proportion of in-kind relative to cash-
transfers, bilateral donors do not react to changes in governance. Nevertheless we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Donors are more likely to deliver multilateral disaster assistance/in-kind assistance if 
the recipient country is characterized by weak quality of institutions and policies. 
 
Strategic interests 
As mentioned in the introduction, donor countries’ aid allocation behavior is not only motivated by 
altruistic reasons but also by strategic considerations. However, donor countries which have non-
stabilization goals, i.e. strategic or political interests, in mind might use other measures as well to 
follow their strategic interest, e.g. use the channel and type of transfers which recipient 
governments value higher. In order to gain utility from strategic influence in the recipient country, it 8 
 
is important for the donor country to ensure that the source of disaster assistance is visible for the 
recipient country. Donor countries transferring money directly to recipient governments might be 
more successful in building up political ties, since the signaling feature of bilateral aid allows more 
visibility than partly anonymous transfers via a multilateral agency.  
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that aid receiving governments value cash payments higher 
than in-kind payments because they can use it in accordance with their own preferences (Bermeo 
2007). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Donors are more likely to give bilateral transfers/ cash transfers to countries where 
they want to promote strategic or political interests.  
 
Transaction costs 
A third aspect which might be relevant for the donor countries behavior, but received minor 
attention so far, is the role of transaction costs. Fink and Radaelli (2009) show that more emergency 
aid is paid to countries being geographically closer to the donor country. Since distance is often 
used as a proxy for bilateral trade, they interpret this relationship from a strategic perspective.
4 
However, our main point of interest is to derive factors which explain the choice of the channel and 
type of emergency assistance and in this respect an alternative interpretation of distance is possible. 
Donor countries might choose to assist via a multilateral agency in cases where the recipient 
country is geographically unconnected and therefore transaction costs are high. Similarly, the 
transaction cost argument would imply that multilateral transfers are more likely if donor and 
recipient country do not share the same language.With respect to the choice of the type of aid this 
argument would suggest to use cash transfers for more distant recipients and in-kind assistance for 
the neighboring countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5: In oder to minimize transaction costs, donors are more likely to use multilateral aid / 9 
 
cash for more distant countries and countries without a similar language. 
Interaction of institutional quality and strategic interests 
In Hypothesis 3 and 4 we propose that bilateral assistance/cash transfers are more likely to be 
provided to countries with good policy performance as well as to countries which are of strategic 
and political interest for the donor country. But how do donor coutries react when these two 
explanatory variables interact? Is good policy performance less of a constraint for bilateral/cash 
transfers if strategic interests are very high? To our knowledge the literature of aid allocation has 
not investigated this question so far. However, since a) the results of Dollar and Levin (2006) do not 
show a singnificant relationship between bilateral aid and good policies and b) Amegashie et al. 
(2007) suggest that the composition of bilateral aid is not adjusted to changes in the moral hazard 
behavior of the recipient country, we assume that the influence of strategic interests on the choice of 
the channel and type of aid is superior to the influence of the quality of institutions and policy. 
Therefore, our last hypothesis states: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The probability of donors assisting by bilateral transfers/ cash transfers is decreasing 
in the interaction of quality of institutions and strategic interests. 
 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1  Research design and data 
We are interested in the decision of potential donor countries (i.e. every country that has not been 
directly affected by a disaster) to provide post-disaster assistance and the channel and type the 
actual donors choose. In order to examine the effect of humanitarian needs of a recipient country 
and strategic interests of a donor country, we construct a basic dyadic dataset for each major natural 
disaster (that is included in the EM-DAT dataset) in a given country between 2000 and 2007. For 
any given disaster in a country, all remaining countries are considered as potential donor nations. 
Including only those cases where one potential donor actually provided aid in our regression would 10 
 
truncate the data. All potential donors (including OECD and non-OECD-countries) that did not 
provide post-disaster assistance are coded zero and this information is used in the first stage 
selection estimates. The combination of 228 disasters, where information on both the channel and 
type of disaster aid is available, and 187 potential donor nations, results in a basic dataset of 42,636 
observations. However, this number is reduced to 25,836 due to missing data. After excluding 
private donations and donations made via NGOs
5 1,341 observations remain where governments 
have actually provided an aid contribution. 901 donations were made by OECD-countries and 440 
by non-OECD-countries. The final dataset includes only natural disasters where we can control for 
the social magnitude of the catastrophe and therefore not all humanitarian catastrophes that are 
included in the FTS OCHA database.
6 This excludes for example civil wars and certain famines that 
are not directly related to droughts. The final dataset provides a mixture of donor-recipient pairs that 
is rather unique in the empirical foreign aid literature. Although the majority of observations 
include emergency aid flows from OECD to developing countries, some emergency aid flows go 
from relatively poor countries (e.g. Afghanistan) to relatively rich countries (e.g. Japan, Republic of 
Korea). 
To test our hypotheses we construct the following set of dependent dummy-variables: The first 
variable, aid, switches to one if a donor has provided some assistance after disaster i in country j 
and is zero otherwise. The second variable, bilateral, describes the channel of aid. It is one for 
bilateral and zero for multilateral disaster assistance. The third variable, cash, defines the type of 
bilateral post-disaster aid. It switches to one for cash and zero for in-kind. In accordance with our 
hypotheses, the explanatory variables can be organized in five groups. First, social magnitude and 
socioeconomic indicators: Disaster measures comprise of indicators for the social magnitude of 
disaster  i the number of fatalities and affected in a disaster (in thousands).
7 To control for 
differences in the measurement of social magnitude, we control for the type of disasters by 
including disaster type specific fixed effects in all specifications. We include the natural logs of 
GDP p.c., population as well as population density as socioeconomic variables. Second, indicators 11 
 
for transaction costs: To account for transaction cost-related differences in the type and channel of 
disaster-relief we include the geographical distance between the donor and recipient country. In 
addition, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether the donor and the recipient speak the 
same language.
8 Third, variables for institutional quality and good governance: To control for the 
recipient country’s institutional quality we include a number of performance indicators. The 
governance indicators we use in our analysis are the Polity IV index of democracy (Marshall & 
Jaggers 2005), the World Bank’s rule of law and corruption control indexes. Fourth, measures for 
strategic interests: In choosing relevant variables that are good empirical proxies for donors’ 
strategic interests in the recipient country we follow the existing empirical literature (e.g. Alesina & 
Dollar 2000, Berthelemy & Tichit 2004, Fink & Redaelli 2009). It includes two variables related to 
geo-political aspects, colonial history between the donor and the recipient as well as an updated 
version of Gartzke's affinity index that is constructed using voting patterns in the United Nations 
General Assembly. We also add the total value of the donor’s exports to the recipient as a control 
for bilateral trade relationships. In addition, we include the recipient’s oil endowment by 
constructing a dummy that switches to one if the country’s oil exports account for more than 30 % 
for the country’s total merchandise exports. To control for a potential relationship between 
institutional quality in the recipient country and strategic interests of the donor we further include 
interaction terms between these two variables. However, the interpretation of interaction terms 
between continuous variables, where one variable can feature positive as well as negative values 
(e.g. the institutional quality variables, rule of law and corruption control) is difficult. We therefore 
transform the continuous, institutional quality variables into dichotomous variables that take the 
value of one if the institutional variables have a value larger than zero. In non-linear models the 
sign, size and significance of the interaction term cannot be evaluated by simply looking at the 
estimated coefficient (Ai and Norton 2003). We therefore apply the procedure proposed by Norton 




3.2  Econometric strategy 
Our goal is to identify the driving factors of the likelihood of choosing a) a certain channel for 
disaster aid (bilateral vs. multilateral) and b) a certain type of disaster aid (cash vs. in-kind). 
However, a number of countries do not receive international disaster assistance at all. The newer 
empirical literature on aid allocation (e.g. Balla and Reinhardt (2008), McGillivray and Oczkowski 
(1992) and Neumayer (2002) has conceptualized the analysis in two stages, a gate-keeping and a 
level-setting stage. The decision on both the channel and the type is basically conditional on the 
decision to provide post-disaster assistance at all.  
 
In our case, the model consists of two stages: The first stage (gate-keeping stage) defines the cases 
where actual post-disaster aid is given. The selection variable is a latent variable 
*
1 y  and equals one 
if aid is given. The second stage is the outcome stage and is estimated in two separate 
specifications. In the first specification it describes the cases where bilateral aid (channel stage) was 
given, while in the second specification (type stage) it describes the cases when cash was 
contributed rather than in-kind. In either of the two specifications we denote this second stage latent 
variable as 
*
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xi  and u i are the explanatory variables and the error terms for the first and the second stage, 
respectively.  ρ is the correlation between the first and second stage errors. We employ two 
estimators to test our hypotheses.
9 First we use a simple two-stage estimator: In the first stage of the 
two-stage estimator we use a probit estimator to analyze the determinants that drive the decision of 
a donor to provide disaster assistance to country j after disaster i or not. This stage includes all 
potential donors (all countries except for the recipient affected by the disaster). At the second stage 
it is determined which channel and which type has been chosen conditional that the recipient has 
received aid. Again probit is used at this stage. This approach requires that the errors in both stages 
are not correlated. In the context of disaster assistance it appears to be a rather unrealistic 
assumption that the decision on the channel or type stage do not take into account information from 
the gate-keeping stage. 
The standard approach to deal with this issue is to apply the two-step estimator developed by 
Heckman (1979). For the gate-keeping stage of this model, the adequate technique of estimation is 
Probit. The traditional Heckman model requires that the second stage outcome equation is estimated 
using OLS. Given the dichotomous character of our dependent variable at the second stage, OLS 
would probably produce biased results. Dubin & Rivers (1989) developed an extended selection 
model where second stage is estimated using a probit model, which is applied in this paper. 
The application of a sample selection model requires unique information in the explanatory 
variables x1 and x2 to separately identify the parameters in the gate-keeping and channel/type stages. 
In the context of aid-allocation, it is rather difficult to find variables that exclusively define the gate-
keeping stage. Neumayer (2003) has applied the total amount of aid in any given year as 
exclusionary variable in his analysis on Arab aid allocation. Koch et al. (2009) used shared religious 
beliefs between the donor and the recipient countries and Balla and Reinhardt (2008) took colonial 
relationship, bilateral trade and aggregate FDI as selection variables. We ran a series of regressions 
using each of the above mentioned variables in separate specifications and only the dummy-variable 14 
 
for previous colonies fulfilled the exclusivity criterion. In addition, we use a variable that measures 
the mortality risk due to natural hazards in a certain country. Consider Bangladesh as an example. 
Bangladesh suffers hundreds of fatalities from severe floods and hurricanes almost on a yearly 
basis. While the country is perceived to be exposed to natural hazard risk and is therefore more 
legitimate to receive disaster assistance, the donor’s decision on the channel and type of aid is 
dependent on the social magnitude and type of the disaster. 
 
3.3 Results 
We start with the presentation of the probit results for the gate-keeping stage in Table 1. One proxy 
for the humanitarian dimension of the disaster, the number of fatalities has a significant and positive 
effect on the likelihood that a contribution is made. Calculating the marginal effects, a 10 % 
increase in the number of fatalities increases the probability of receiving disaster assistance by 7 %. 
In contrast to results in the ODA-literature, but in accordance with the findings by Fink & Redaelli 
(2009), smaller countries are more likely to receive disaster assistance. GDP p.c. appears to have no 
significant effect. Democracies (measured by the policy variable) have a higher likelihood of being 
target of disaster aid, while the coefficients for the good governance indicators, rule of law and 
corruption control, show significant signs that contradict our hypothesis. Countries with lower 
quality institutions seem to attract more disaster assistance. Fink & Redaelli (2009) find a similar 
trend for policy performance indicators; however their results are not significantly different from 
zero. Trading partners are also more likely to receive disaster aid, while the coefficient for oil 
exporting countries is positive but only significant on a 10%-level. The specifications in columns 7 
and 8 introduce dummies that account for either low levels in rule of law or high corruption. The 
interaction term between low levels in rule of law and oil exporting countries has a positive and 
significant sign. These results suggest that being an oil-exporting country per se does not suffice to 
raise the strategic interests of a donor. However, the combination of being an oil-exporting country 
and bad governed makes it more likely to receive a contribution after a humanitarian catastrophe. 15 
 
Interacting the imports from donors-variable with the institutional indicators does not yield 
significant results. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes the second stage estimates on the decision on the channel of disaster aid if a 
contribution has been made. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the contribution 
was bilateral and zero if it was multilateral. Disasters with a large number of fatalities are more 
likely to attract multilateral aid. Donor countries are more likely to delegate disaster assistance to 
multinational organization when the event has catastrophic proportions and the chaotic and complex 
nature of the situation demands a variety of skills and knowledge. Less distant countries and 
countries with the same language are more likely to receive bilateral aid which confirms the 
transaction cost hypothesis. Opposed to our third hypothesis, democracies as well as countries with 
lower levels in the World Bank’s index for the rule of law are also more likely to receive assistance 
via a multinational agency rather than bilaterally. The signs of coefficients for the strategic 
variables point in opposing directions. Trading partners are more likely to receive bilateral aid while 
oil exporting countries have a higher probability of receiving multilateral aid. Interestingly, 
applying again the interaction term between bad governance and oil exporting country reveals a 
positive and significant sign.  
[Table 2 about here] 
In the next step we analyze the determinants of the type of emergency aid. In contrast to the 
estimates on the channel of aid, the level of democracy has no significant impact on the type of 
disaster assistance. Rule of law and corruption control even significantly increase the likelihood of 
receiving cash rather than in-kind transfers. Again the strategic variables have opposing signs. 
Trading partners are more likely to receive cash aid, while oil-exporting countries have a higher 
probability of receiving in-kind transfers.  
[Table 3 about here] 
These second stage results might be biased due to the omission of the inverse Mills ratio. Tables 4 16 
 
and 5 replicate the results for the channel and type stage using the Heckman probit approach. A 
dummy for colonial relationship as well as a variable accounting for the recipient country’s 
mortality risk due to natural hazards has been included in the first stage probit estimates. The results 
are largely robust, except for the strategic variable that accounts for trade volume with the recipient 
country where the coefficients lose their significance. However, the Wald test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of independent equations and thus our results from the basic two stage approach 
appear to be unbiased. Although the coefficients for the trade variable appear to be significant in the 
two-stage estimates and the Wald test favors the two-stage instead of the Heckman approach, the 
results should be interpreted with care.  
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
The analysis so far has assumed that the variables that explain the choice on the composition of aid 
do not differ between countries. The empirical literature, however, suggests that donors' decision on 
ODA (e.g. Alesina & Dollar 2000, Kuziemko & Werker 2006) and disaster aid (e.g. Fink & 
Redaelli 2009) are not the same across donor nations. For expositional convenience, we limit our 
analysis to a comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries. This robustness test basically 
splits the sample in OECD and non-OECD donor subsamples and repeats the estimates in tables 1 - 
3 for each subsample, respectively. 
At the gate-keeping stage the estimates for both sub-samples are very similar and basically reflect 
the results from the full sample estimates.  The decision to provide emergency assistance is driven 
by the magnitude of the disaster and some strategic variables in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries. The coefficient of the trade variable is virtually identical in both samples
10. The results 
for the channel and type stage for each subsample are shown in Table 6. At the channel stage, the 
negative sign of the polity variable in full sample (Table 2) appear to be largely driven by the non-
OECD subsample.  
Regarding the type of disaster aid, non-OECD countries appear to be more concerned about the rule 17 
 
of law and corruption control index when they supply cash, while the coefficient for the trade 
variable is larger in size and appears to have a better level of statistical significance (at the 1 %-
level) for the OECD subsample than for the non-OECD counterpart (significance only at the 10 % 
level). The effect of the oil-exporting dummy is negative in both subsamples.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4  Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to have a closer look on donor countries’ aid allocation behavior by 
distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral assistance as well as cash and in-kind assistance. 
Our results show that strategic concerns (trade relations) are not only relevant for the geographical 
allocation of aid, but also for the decision on the type and the channel of aid. The empirical 
application shows that recipient countries are more likely to receive bilateral transfers, if the 
disaster is less complex, transaction costs are low or the donor country is a trading partner. The 
likelihood of receiving cash rather than in-kind assistance again increases if the donor country is a 
trading partner.  
Donor countries’ behavior appears to be only reflected in the geographical allocation of disaster 
assistance, but also in the choice of the channel and type of aid. Countries which were so far 
supposed to allocate aid in line with the motive of need or merit might follow their strategic 
interests by allocating bilateral assistance or cash to countries which are of particular strategic and 
political interest for them. The dataset also includes post-disaster aid flows from non-OECD 
countries to OECD countries. Splitting the sample along into OECD and non-OECD countries, we 
find differences in the allocation behavior between these two groups: while non-OECD countries 
seem to pay more attention to corruption control and rule of law, OECD countries attach more 








Ai, C. & Norton, E. C. (2003), Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters 80, 
pp. 123-129. 
 
Alesina, A. F. & Dollar, D. (2000), Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic 
Growth 5(1), 33-63. 
 
Amegashie, A. J., Ouattara, B. & Strobl, E. (2007), Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: 
Theory with an application on foreign aid. CESifoWorking Paper No. 1996, CESifo.  
 
Anbarci, N. & Escaleras, M. & Register, C. A. (2005), Earthquake fatalities: the interaction of 
nature and political economy. Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10), pp. 1907-1933. 
 
Balla, E. & Reinhardt G. Y. (2008), Giving and receiving aid: Does conflict count? World 
           Development 36(12), 2566-2585. 
 
Bermeo, S. B. (2007), Utility maximization and strategic development - A model of foreign aid 
allocation. Department of Politics, Princeton University, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211087_index.html. 
 
Berthelemy, J.-C. & Tichit, A. (2004), Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decision - a three-
dimensional panel analysis. International Review of Economics & Finance 13(3), 253-274. 
 
Cassen, R., et al. (1986), Does aid work? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Coate, S. (2001), Altruism, the Samaritan’s dilemma, and government transfer policy. American 
Economic Review 85(1), 46-57. 
 
Correlates of War 2 Project (2008), Colonial/Dependency contiguity data, 1816-2002. 
http://correlatesofwar.org Version 3.0. 
 
Dilley, M. Chen, R. S., Deichmann, U. Lerner-Lam., A. L., Arnold, M. Agwe, J., Buys, P.,                                   
Kjekstad, O.Lyon, B. & Yetman, G. (2005), Natural disaster hotspots: A global risk 
analysis. Disaster Risk Management Series No. 5, The World Bank and Columbia 
University, Washington D. C. 
 
Dollar, D. & Levin, V. (2006), The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2003. World 
Development 34(12), 2034-2046. 
 
Dreher, A., Mölders, F. & Nunnenkamp, P. (2007), Are NGOs the better donors? A case study of 
aid allocation for Sweden. Working Paper 1383, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel. 
 
Dubin, J. A. & Rivers, D. (1989), Selection bias in linear regression, logit and probit Models. 
Journal of Economic Growth 5(1), 33–63. 
 
Dudley, L. & Montmarquette, C. (1976), A model of the supply of bilateral foreign aid. American 
Economic Review 66(1), 132–142. 
 
EM-DAT (2008), The OFDA/CRED international disaster database – www.emdat.be, Universite 
catholique de Louvain, Belgium. 19 
 
Fink, G. & Redaelli, S. (2009), Determinants of international emergency aid: Humanitarian need 
only? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4839, The World Bank. 
 
Gleditsch, K. S. & Ward, M. D. (2001), Measuring space: A minimum distance database. Journal of 
Peace Research 38, pp. 749-768. 
 
Haveman, J., http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/Data/ 
 Gravity/language.txt 
 
Heckman, J. J. (1979), Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1), 153-161.  
 
Hoeffler, A., and V. Outram (2008). Need, merit or self-interest: What determines the allocation                       
of aid? CSAE Working Paper 2008-19, Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies. 
 
Kahn, M. E. (2005), The death toll from natural disasters: The role of income, geography and 
institutions. The Review of Economics and Statistics 87(2), pp. 271-284. 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2008), Governance matters VII: Aggregate and 
individual governance indicators 1996-2007. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 4654, 
The World Bank. 
 
Koch, D-J., Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P. & Thiele, R. (2009), Keeping a low profile: What 
determines the allocation of aid by non-governmental organizations? World Development 
37(5), pp. 902-918. 
 
Kuziemko, I. & Werker, E. (2006), How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreign aid 
and bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy 114(5), 905–930. 
 
Marshall, M. G. & Jaggers, K. (2005), Polity IV project. Political regime characteristics and 
transition, 1800-2004. Version 2004. 
 
McGillivray, M. & Oczkowski, E. (1992), A two-part sample selection model of British bilateral 
aid allocation. Applied Economics 24(12), 1311-1319. 
 
Nancy, G. & Yontcheva, B. (2006), Does NGO aid go to the poor?: Empirical evidence from 
Europe. IMF Working Paper No. 06/39. 
 
Norton, E. C. ,Wang, H. & Ai, C. (2004), Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit 
and probit models. The Stata Journal 4(2), pp. 154-167. 
 
Neumayer, E. (2002), Is good governance rewarded? A cross-national analysis of debt forgiveness. 
World Development 30(6), pp. 913-930. 
 
Neumayer, E. (2003), What factors determine the allocation of aid by Arab countries and 
multilateral agencies? Journal of Development Studies, 39(4), 134-47. 
 
Neumayer, E. (2005), Is the allocation of food aid free from donor interest bias? Journal of 
Development Studies 41 (3), pp. 27-40. 
 
Nunnenkamp, P., Öhler, H. (2009), Aid allocation through various official and private channels: 
Need, merit and self-interest as motives of German donors. Kiel Working Paper, 1536, Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy. 20 
 
 
Nunnenkamp, P, J. Weingarth & J. Weisser (2009), Is NGO aid not so different after all? 
Comparing the allocation of Swiss aid by private and official donors. European Journal of 
Political Economy 25(4): 422-438. 
 
Svensson, J. (2000), When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. 
Journal of Development Economics 61(1), 61-84. 
 
Thiele, R., P. Nunnenkamp & A. Dreher (2007), Do donors target aid in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals? A sector perspective of aid allocation. Review of World Economics 143 
(4), pp. 596-630. 
 
United Nations Comtrade (2007), United Nations commodity trade statistics database. 
http://comtrade.un.org. 
 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2009), Financial 
            Tracking Service (FTS) – The global humanitarian aid database. 
            http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/pageloader.aspx 
 
UN-Millennium Project (2005), Investing in development: A practical plan to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals.  
 
Voeten, E. & Merdzanovic, A. (2009), United Nations General Assembly voting data, 
hdl:1902.1/12379 unf:3:hpf6qokddzzvxf9m66yltg= =, Georgetown University. 
 
World Bank (1998), Assessing aid: What works, what doesn’t and why. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
World Bank (2006), World development indicators, CD-Rom. Washington, D.C. 21 
 
Table 1. Determinants of disaster aid activity (gate-keeping stage), Probit 
_    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   0.136***  0.082***  0.082***  0.136***  0.169***  0.129***  0.080***  0.081***   0.090***  0.089*** 
  (0.029)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.029)   (0.036)   (0.029)   (0.026)   (0.026)    (0.034)  (0.034) 
Ln(Affected)  0.025   -0.005   -0.006   0.032   0.017   0.028   -0.007   -0.010    -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.028)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.025)   (0.014)   (0.013)    (0.016)  (0.016) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.091   -0.051   -0.058   -0.082   -0.321***  -0.107*   -0.076   -0.084    -0.312***  -0.309*** 
  (0.055)   (0.068)   (0.072)   (0.061)   (0.064)   (0.060)   (0.064)   (0.066)    (0.080)  (0.084) 
Ln(Population)  -0.177***  -0.134***  -0.137***  -0.187***  -0.404***  -0.183***  -0.144***  -0.142***   -0.356***  -0.356*** 
  (0.035)   (0.028)   (0.028)   (0.041)   (0.054)   (0.033)   (0.028)   (0.028)    (0.047)  (0.044) 
Pop dens.   0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.000   -0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000    0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Distance   -0.065***  -0.053***  -0.054***  -0.073***  -0.042***  -0.062***  -0.053***  -0.053***   -0.029***  -0.029*** 
  (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.007)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
Common language  0.215**   0.038   0.035   0.308***  0.079   0.233**   0.042   0.029    -0.080  -0.098 
  (0.103)   (0.096)   (0.095)   (0.112)   (0.115)   (0.105)   (0.097)   (0.095)    (0.107)  (0.105) 
Polity  0.112***      0.078***  0.085***  0.118***         
  (0.020)       (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.020)          
Former colony  0.845***  0.899***  0.898***  0.574***  0.140   0.857***  0.908***  0.903***   0.156  0.148 
  (0.124)   (0.153)   (0.152)   (0.138)   (0.146)   (0.124)   (0.154)   (0.152)    (0.159)  (0.155) 
Hazard mortality  0.019   0.028*   0.031*   0.031   0.043*   0.023   0.034**   0.034**    0.058***  0.054** 
  (0.019)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.020)   (0.023)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.016)    (0.309)  (0.302) 
Rule of Law    -0.149*                  
    (0.090)                  
Corruption      -0.132                
Control      (0.090)                
Affinity index         -1.468***             
        (0.158)              
Imports from donor          0.283***        0.274***  0.306*** 
          (0.020)         (0.039)  (0.047) 
Oil dummy             0.292*   -0.376**   -0.303       
            (0.173)   (0.175)   (0.201)       
Low Rule of Law               0.144     0.209   
              (0.100)     (0.154)   
Oil dummy X              0.534**        
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.239)        
High corruption                 0.122      0.395** 
                (0.151)      (0.168) 
Oil dummy X                 0.480*       
High corruption
 a                (0.255)       
Imports from donorX                  -0.006   
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.035)   
Imports from donorX                    -0.039 
High corruption
 a                    (0.046) 
Constant  0.330   1.073   1.177   1.897**   5.021***  0.413   1.372*   1.453*    5.547***  5.387*** 
  (0.748)   (0.760)   (0.788)   (0.858)   (0.954)   (0.782)   (0.713)   (0.769)    (0.965)  (0.996) 
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.148  0.110  0.109  0.188  0.262  0.151  0.111  0.111  0.211  0.212 
N  24241   25817   25817   23389   24241   24241   25817   25817    25817  25817 
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
aid, a dummy that switches to 1 if a contribution was made. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in 
accordance with Norton et al. (2004). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively 










Table 2. Determinants of the channel of disaster aid, Probit 
_    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.128**   -0.038   -0.040   -0.129**   -0.090*   -0.080*   -0.055   -0.063*    -0.027   -0.032   
  (0.052)   (0.037)   (0.037)   (0.051)   (0.051)   (0.045)   (0.036)   (0.037)    (0.036)   (0.038)   
Ln(Affected)  -0.003   0.008   0.013   -0.005   -0.014   -0.034   0.020   0.032*    0.009   0.020   
  (0.030)   (0.019)   (0.020)   (0.028)   (0.028)   (0.026)   (0.020)   (0.019)    (0.020)   (0.020)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.235**   0.054   0.077   0.214*   0.039   0.316***  0.126   0.155    0.019   0.071   
  (0.116)   (0.123)   (0.130)   (0.119)   (0.119)   (0.113)   (0.111)   (0.115)    (0.128)   (0.135)   
Ln(Population)  0.067   0.034   0.035   0.059   -0.153**   0.097   0.022   0.004    -0.053   -0.049   
  (0.066)   (0.050)   (0.053)   (0.065)   (0.071)   (0.061)   (0.046)   (0.048)    (0.070)   (0.066)   
Pop dens.   -0.001**   -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001**   -0.001*   -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.001***   -0.001***  -0.001***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   -0.097***  -0.127***  -0.128***  -0.095***  -0.093***  -0.112***  -0.126***  -0.126***   -0.123***  -0.121***  
  (0.017)   (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.019)   (0.019)    (0.019)   (0.020)   
Common language  0.957***  0.409   0.425*   0.971***  0.796***  0.859***  0.505*   0.561**    0.292   0.366   
  (0.247)   (0.251)   (0.254)   (0.242)   (0.252)   (0.252)   (0.257)   (0.264)    (0.248)   (0.253)   
Polity  -0.170***      -0.165***  -0.208***  -0.177***         
  (0.045)       (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.043)          
Former colony  0.429   -0.011   0.001   0.468*   0.224   0.378   -0.029   -0.021    -0.126   -0.103   
  (0.275)   (0.367)   (0.367)   (0.275)   (0.309)   (0.286)   (0.370)   (0.366)    (0.355)   (0.339)   
Hazard mortality  -0.017   -0.027   -0.032   -0.016   -0.025   -0.047   -0.043   -0.036    -0.047   -0.038   
  (0.037)   (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.037)   (0.039)   (0.039)   (0.030)   (0.031)    (0.034)   (0.035)   
Rule of Law    0.321*                  
    (0.170)                  
Corruption      0.227                
Control      (0.214)                
Affinity index         0.193              
        (0.348)              
Imports from donor          0.195***        0.212**   0.202**   
          (0.037)         (0.083)   (0.088)   
Oil dummy             -1.038***  -2.364***  -2.606***     
            (0.239)   (0.243)   (0.289)       
Low Rule of Law               -0.433**        
              (0.197)        
Oil dummy X               1.984***       
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.285)        
High corruption                 -0.218      0.608   
                (0.260)      (0.486)   
Oil dumm Xy                 2.119***      
High corruption
 a                (0.360)       
Imports from donor X                  -0.180**    
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.083)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.154*   
High corruption
 a                    (0.090)   
Constant  -1.191   -1.028   -1.326   -1.043   3.470*   -1.484   -1.218   -1.455    0.018   -0.883   
  (1.641)   (1.163)   (1.201)   (1.686)   (1.821)   (1.596)   (1.085)   (1.252)    (1.534)   (1.730)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.258  0.209  0.205  0.260  0.297  0.286  0.227  0.223  0.223  0.216 
N  829   1109   1109   808   829   829   1109   1109    1109  1109 
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
bilateral, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral.. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in 












Table 3. Determinants of the type of disaster aid, Probit 
_    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.083***  -0.046   -0.048   -0.085**   -0.058*   -0.071**   -0.058*   -0.065*    -0.041   -0.047   
  (0.032)   (0.036)   (0.036)   (0.036)   (0.033)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.035)    (0.036)   (0.038)   
Ln(Affected)  0.034   -0.005   0.000   0.045   0.031   0.023   0.004   0.017    -0.004   0.009   
  (0.029)   (0.014)   (0.015)   (0.029)   (0.028)   (0.026)   (0.016)   (0.014)    (0.015)   (0.015)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.160**   -0.125   -0.100   0.165**   0.043   0.176**   -0.062   -0.034    -0.147   -0.100   
  (0.068)   (0.091)   (0.097)   (0.066)   (0.071)   (0.070)   (0.096)   (0.101)    (0.100)   (0.101)   
Ln(Population)  0.069   0.048   0.054   0.028   -0.061   0.081*   0.062   0.042    0.009   0.003   
  (0.049)   (0.042)   (0.044)   (0.052)   (0.060)   (0.048)   (0.039)   (0.044)    (0.061)   (0.063)   
Pop dens.   -0.001***  -0.000   -0.000   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001***  -0.000**   -0.000    -0.000   -0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   0.040**   -0.013   -0.015   0.022   0.046***  0.037**   -0.012   -0.013    -0.009   -0.010   
  (0.016)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.018)   (0.018)    (0.018)   (0.018)   
Common language  0.215   -0.082   -0.057   0.197   0.156   0.191   -0.084   -0.015    -0.165   -0.103   
  (0.194)   (0.205)   (0.215)   (0.187)   (0.188)   (0.193)   (0.204)   (0.212)    (0.201)   (0.213)   
Polity  0.031       0.000   0.014   0.024          
  (0.027)       (0.027)   (0.028)   (0.027)          
Former colony  0.125   0.011   0.021   0.018   -0.006   0.106   -0.010   0.011    -0.094   -0.056   
  (0.246)   (0.232)   (0.232)   (0.251)   (0.254)   (0.245)   (0.227)   (0.226)    (0.230)   (0.226)   
Hazard mortality  0.021   -0.019   -0.021   0.012   0.017   0.012   -0.034*   -0.025    -0.032   -0.022   
  (0.027)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.021)   (0.020)    (0.020)   (0.021)   
Rule of Law    0.405***                 
    (0.145)                  
Corruption      0.364**                
Control      (0.184)                
Affinity index         -0.905***             
        (0.256)              
Imports from donor          0.111***        0.085   0.094   
          (0.029)         (0.060)   (0.060)   
Oil dummy             -0.340*  -0.772*  -1.114***     
            (0.197)  (0.263)  (0.306)     
Low Rule of Law               -0.509*    -0.346    
              (0.234)    (0.352)    
Oil dummy X               0.405       
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.360)       
High corruption                 -0.341    -0.029   
                (0.238)    (0.342)   
Oil dummy X                 0.649     
High corruption
 a                (0.416)     
Imports from donor X                  -0.053    
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.057)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.062   
High corruption
 a                    (0.056)   
Constant  -4.556***  -0.979  -1.312  -3.169**  -1.997  -4.579  -1.471  -1.659  -0.283   -0.922   
  (1.165)  (0.991)  (1.026)  (1.289)  (1.368)  (1.145)  (0.960)  (1.099)  (1.258)   (1.360)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.068  0.049  0.044  0.089  0.087  0.073  0.056  0.050  0.055  0.044 
N  825   1106   1106   804   825   825   1106   1106    1106  1106 
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
cash, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid contribution was cash. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in 
accordance with Norton et al. (2004). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 










Table 4. Determinants of the channel of disaster aid, Heckman 
Pr(bilateral=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.171***  -0.037   -0.040   -0.161**   -0.090   -0.122***  -0.051   -0.060    0.012   0.001   
  (0.050)   (0.049)   (0.051)   (0.063)   (0.108)   (0.047)   (0.053)   (0.049)    (0.065)   (0.079)   
Ln(Affected)  -0.018   0.005   0.009   -0.021   -0.022   -0.049*   0.016   0.027*    0.006   0.015   
  (0.031)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.025)   (0.019)   (0.016)    (0.015)   (0.016)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.239**   0.021   0.035   0.213*   0.012   0.303***  0.080   0.102    -0.133   -0.068   
  (0.104)   (0.129)   (0.135)   (0.113)   (0.200)   (0.105)   (0.117)   (0.120)    (0.170)   (0.208)   
Ln(Population)  0.135*   0.013   0.011   0.112   -0.156   0.155**   -0.018   -0.027    -0.208   -0.185   
  (0.070)   (0.065)   (0.067)   (0.096)   (0.224)   (0.073)   (0.065)   (0.062)    (0.148)   (0.176)   
Pop dens.   -0.001**   -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***   -0.001   -0.001*   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.001)   (0.001)   
Distance   -0.066*   -0.131***  -0.132***  -0.073   -0.094***  -0.093**   -0.132***  -0.131***   -0.120***  -0.121***  
  (0.036)   (0.023)   (0.023)   (0.054)   (0.032)   (0.037)   (0.022)   (0.022)    (0.025)   (0.025)   
Common language  0.807***  0.437*   0.461*   0.869**   0.798***  0.777***  0.551**   0.601**    0.242   0.311   
  (0.264)   (0.255)   (0.259)   (0.363)   (0.248)   (0.277)   (0.261)   (0.268)    (0.250)   (0.292)   
Polity  -0.191***      -0.172***  -0.198***  -0.188***         
  (0.053)       (0.055)   (0.073)   (0.058)          
Rule of Law    0.342**                  
    (0.172)                  
Corruption      0.261                
Control      (0.203)                
Affinity index         0.504              
        (0.792)              
Imports from donor          0.204         0.298**   0.295*   
          (0.152)         (0.119)   (0.164)   
Oil dummy             -0.988***  -2.393***  -2.686***      
            (0.215)   (0.224)   (0.271)       
Low Rule of Law               -0.386**     0.233    
              (0.189)     (0.392)    
Oil dummy X               2.064***       
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.268)        
High corruption                 -0.295      0.650   
                (0.260)      (0.488)   
Oil dummy X                 2.264***      
High corruption
 a                (0.342)       
Imports from donor X                  -0.153**    
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.060)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.152*   
High corruption
 a                    (0.087)   
Constant  -1.016   -0.648   -0.869   -1.301   3.550   -1.529   -0.701   -0.838    2.280   1.148   
  (1.566)   (1.193)   (1.206)   (1.623)   (2.637)   (1.638)   (1.083)   (1.220)    (2.221)   (2.758)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald Test
  0.211  0.846  0.820  0.633  0.961  0.456  0.699  0.749  0.399  0.550 
N   828   1109   1109   807   828   828   1109   1109    1109  1109 
Notes: Results of the 2
nd stage estimates. Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-
year-level. Dependent variable is bilateral, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. The Wald test for 
independent equations tests if the correlation between the errors of the first and the second stage equations is 
significantly different from zero. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in accordance with Norton et al. 












Table 5. Determinants of the type of disaster aid, Heckman 
                     
Ln(Fatalities)  -0.108**  -0.045   -0.046   -0.106**   -0.137**   -0.087*   -0.065*   -0.072*    -0.004   -0.024   
  (0.043)  (0.041)   (0.042)   (0.050)   (0.061)   (0.046)   (0.038)   (0.038)    (0.046)   (0.052)   
Ln(Affected)  0.031  -0.007   -0.003   0.041   0.016   0.020   0.002   0.015    -0.005   0.007   
  (0.031)  (0.013)   (0.014)   (0.033)   (0.042)   (0.027)   (0.017)   (0.014)    (0.014)   (0.013)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.184***  -0.148   -0.127   0.181***  0.199   0.195***  -0.087   -0.063    -0.257**   -0.182   
  (0.068)  (0.091)   (0.096)   (0.065)   (0.127)   (0.070)   (0.097)   (0.099)    (0.110)   (0.115)   
Ln(Population)  0.101*  0.032   0.037   0.057   0.160   0.106*   0.045   0.032    -0.131   -0.089   
  (0.059)  (0.050)   (0.052)   (0.073)   (0.209)   (0.061)   (0.049)   (0.053)    (0.100)   (0.118)   
Pop dens.  -0.001**  -0.000   -0.000   -0.001**   -0.001   -0.001***  -0.000*   -0.000    -0.000   -0.000   
  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance  0.053***  -0.017   -0.019   0.035   0.059***  0.046**   -0.013   -0.012    -0.019   -0.017   
  (0.020)  (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.027)   (0.014)   (0.020)   (0.023)   (0.023)    (0.017)   (0.018)   
Common language  0.164  -0.062   -0.034   0.140   0.088   0.153   -0.051   0.008    -0.170   -0.113   
  (0.210)  (0.202)   (0.212)   (0.229)   (0.204)   (0.215)   (0.199)   (0.209)    (0.183)   (0.208)   
Polity  0.003      -0.015   -0.033   0.004          
  (0.037)      (0.034)   (0.053)   (0.039)          
Rule of Law    0.412***                 
    (0.150)                  
Corruption      0.381**                
Control      (0.185)                
Affinity index        -0.637              
        (0.554)              
Imports from donor          -0.055         0.179**   0.165   
          (0.164)         (0.087)   (0.111)   
Oil dummy            -0.392*   -0.768**   -1.148***      
            (0.202)   (0.308)   (0.327)       
Low Rule of Law              -0.501**     -0.242    
              (0.231)     (0.347)    
Oil dummy X               0.425        
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.403)        
High corruption                -0.406*      0.046   
                (0.236)      (0.382)   
Oil dummy X                 0.710*       
High corruption a                (0.430)       
Imports from donor X                  -0.049    
Low Rule of Law a                  (0.049)    
Imports from donor X                       -0.068   
High corruption a                       (0.055)   
Constant      -4.280***  -0.718        -1.008     -3.284**     -3.833**       -4.434***  -1.083   -1.250    1.593   0.358   
  (1.248)  (0.985)   (1.002)   (1.276)   (1.625)   (1.234)   (0.976)   (1.044)    (1.578)   (1.722)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald Test
  0.389  0.812  0.807  0.571  0.378  0.577  0.987  0.944  0.219  0.462 
N  825  1106   1106   804   825   825   1106   1106    1106  1106 
Notes: Results of the 2
nd stage estimates. Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-
year-level. Dependent variable is cash, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid contribution was cash. The Wald test for 
independent equations tests if the correlation between the errors of the first and the second stage equations is 
significantly different from zero. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in accordance with Norton et al. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1. List of recipient countries' total fatalities and number of disasters  
Recipient    Fatalities    Disasters    Recipient    Fatalities    Disasters  
 Afghanistan    669    6    Lao, PDR    15    1  
Albania    1    1    Madagascar    602    5  
Algeria    971    4    Malawi    567    3  
Argentina    23    1    Malaysia    80    1  
Armenia    n.a.    1    Maldives    102    2  
Azerbaijan    31    1    Mali    2    2  
Bahamas, The    1    1    Mauritania    1    1  
Bangladesh    2,309    4    Mexico    84    3  
Belize    44    3    Micronesia, Fed. Sts.    48    3  
Bolivia    271    6    Moldova    -    1  
Botswana    3    1    Mongolia    23    2  
Brazil    50    1    Morocco    708    2  
Bulgaria    17    1    Mozambique    908    3  
Cambodia    403    2    Myanmar    307    2  
Central African Rep.    1    1    Namibia    2    1  
Chile    40    3    Nepal    657    2  
China    1,185    4    Nicaragua    33    4  
Colombia    109    2    Niger    4    2  
Comoros    1    3    Oman    76    1  
Costa Rica    24    4    Pakistan    74,137    7  
Cuba    22    4    Panama    11    1  
Czech Republic    18    1    Papua New Guinea    n.a.    1  
Djibouti    51    2    Peru    815    5  
Dominica    2    1    Philippines    3,070    5  
Dominican Republic    830    3    Poland    27    1  
Ecuador    21    4    Portugal    14    1  
El Salvador    863    3    Romania    33    2  
Ethiopia    498    1    Russian Federation    101    2  
Fiji    17    1    Senegal    28    1  
Georgia    6    3    Seychelles    3    1  
Ghana    72    3    Solomon Islands    52    2  
Grenada    39    1    Somalia    350    2  
Guatemala    n.a.    1    Sri Lanka    35,634    3  
Guinea    n.a.    1    St. Lucia    1    1  
Guyana    34    1    Sudan    85    3  
Haiti    2,857    4    Suriname    3    1  
Honduras    21    2    Tajikistan    27    4  
Hungary    1    2    Thailand    8,449    2  
India    38,730    7    Togo    41    1  
Indonesia    172,214    10    Tonga    n.a.    1  
Iran    28,110    5    Turkey    219    2  
Jamaica    29    4    Uganda    18    1  
Japan    40    1    Ukraine    9    1  
Kenya    173    3    Uruguay    9    2  
Korea, DPR    934    3    Vanuatu    3    3  
Korea, Republic of    210    2    Venezuela    80    2  
Kyrgyzstan    38    2    Vietnam    844    3  
       Zimbabwe    70    1  28 
 
   
Table  A.2. List of donor countries' total contributions and number of donations 
  Donor   Total contribution    Events   Donor   Total contribution    Events  
   (in USD)         (in USD)       
 Afghanistan    500,000    2    Iceland    473,627    13  
Algeria    2,489,199    5    India    23,630,944    10  
Andorra    58,386    2    Indonesia    n.a.    1  
Angola    n.a.    1    Iran    347,380    3  
Argentina    n.a.    8    Ireland    40,573,378    131  
Armenia    n.a.    2    Israel    2,357,000    17  
Australia    54,936,086    115    Italy    76,690,358    121  
Austria    11,436,846    40    Japan    445,981,017    195  
Azerbaijan    622,000    4    Jordan    n.a.    3  
Bahrain    n.a.    1    Kazakhstan    n.a.    2  
Bangladesh    100,000    2    Kenya    75,000    1  
Belarus    113,018    1    Korea, DPR    130,000    5  
Belgium    44,886,419    79    Korea, Republic of    1,576,709    22  
Bolivia    n.a.    1    Kuwait    3,366,013    12  
Botswana    482,000    3    Kyrgyzstan    27,093,596    2  
Brazil    200,000    13    Lao, PDR    75,000    3  
Bulgaria    103,717    2    Latvia    446,726    6  
Burundi    20,000    1    Lebanon    n.a.    1  
Canada    108,799,910    204    Lesotho    110,000    2  
Chile    30,000    7    Libya    1,500,000    6  
China    14,009,631    56    Liechtenstein    305,278    7  
Colombia    100,000    5    Lithuania    252,631    5  
Costa Rica    n.a.    1    Luxembourg    12,165,218    46  
Croatia    n.a.    2    Malawi    100,000    2  
Cuba    129,965    7    Malaysia    5,138,948    18  
Cyprus    756,462    17    Malta    10,854,817    1  
Czech Republic    5,498,495    20    Mauritania    200,336    3  
Denmark    60,283,135    146    Mauritius    80,000    3  
Dominican Republic    196,370    3    Mexico    4,127,922    8  
Ecuador    13,237    4    Moldova    455,307    5  
Egypt    300,000    3    Monaco    640,081    16  
El Salvador    n.a.    1    Morocco    496,980    9  
Eritrea    n.a.    1    Namibia    800,000    1  
Estonia    577,084    9    Nepal    235,391    4  
Fiji    9,700    1    Netherlands    101,964,604    139  
Finland    25,055,726    56    New Zealand    15,536,259    50  
France    48,601,080    118    Nicaragua    n.a.    1  
Gabon    200,000    1    Nigeria    1,150,000    3  
Germany    174,339,341    371    Norway    117,858,752    223  
Ghana    100,000    1    Oman    100,000    3  
Greece    27,047,570    51    Pakistan    157,560    3  
Guatemala    n.a.    2    Palau    51,772    2  
Guyana    20,000    1    Panama    n.a.    2  
Honduras    n.a.    1    Peru    111,130    8  
Hungary    1,005,267    19    Poland    6,966,713    25  
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Table A.2. List of donor countries’ total contributions and 
Number of donations (cont.) 
Donor  Total contribution  Events 
  (in USD)   
Portugal  10,127,312  30 
Qatar  22,350,468  13 
Romania  2,639,255  8 
Russian Federation  6,615,748  27 
Rwanda  10,000  2 
San Marino  19,807  1 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of)  83,804,806  63 
Seychelles  n.a.  1 
Singapore  4,850,500  23 
Slovakia  2,705,516  21 
Slovenia  709,334  17 
South Africa  3,852,500  10 
Spain  73,199,347  78 
Sri Lanka  n.a.  1 
Sudan  10,000  1 
Swaziland  15,000  1 
Sweden  107,626,853  210 
Switzerland  19,264,147  113 
Syrian Arab Republic  n.a.  5 
Tajikistan  n.a.  1 
Thailand  1,085,202  13 
Trinidad and Tobago  2,625,000  5 
Tunisia  n.a.  3 
Turkey  40,724,138  58 
Ukraine  n.a.  2 
United Arab Emirates  34,668,256  35 
United Kingdom  306,310,134  343 
United States of America  460,435,164  495 
Venezuela  1,800,000  11 
Vietnam  n.a.  1 
Zambia  20,000  3 
 
Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable    Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Bilateral  1341  0.535  0.499  0  1 
Cash  1341  0.165  0.371  0  1 
Ln(Fatalities)   1341  18,478  42,784  0  165,708 
Ln(Affected)  1341  2,063,052  10,517,813  0  300000000 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  1299  3,851  3,259  540,819  27,114 
Ln(Population)  1341  96.833  229.605  0.084  1,304.500 
Pop dens.   1341  178.712  245.403  1.531  1,097.327 
Distance   1340  6.445  3.908  0.143  19.312 
Common 
language 
1341  0.102  0.303  0  1 
Polity  836  8.264  2.555  0  10 
Rule of Law  1116  -0.543  0.548  -1.740  1.320 
Corruption  1116  -0.582  0.466  -1.510  1.480 
Affinity index   1255  0.772  0.241  -0.425  1 
Imports from 
donor 
1313  953  8,802  0  270,461 








Table A.4. Variable Definition and Source 
Variable  Description  Source 
Emergency aid   Dummy variables describing the channel 
(bilateral vs. multilateral) and type (cash vs. 
in-kind) of emergency relief 
FTS, OCHA (2009) 
 Fatalities   Total number killed by a natural disaster   EM-DAT, CRED (2008)  
 Affected   Total number affected by a natural disaster   EM-DAT, CRED (2008)  
Disaster 
dummies 
Describe which type of natural disaster 
occurred. 
EM-DAT, CRED (2008) 
 
GDP p.c.  GDP per capita (US Dollars in 2000 prices)   World Bank (2008), 
World Development Indicators  
Population  Total Population expressed in thousands   World Bank (2008),  
    World Development Indicators 
Population  Population per km
2   World Bank (2008),  
density    World Development Indicators 
Distance   Distance between donor's and recipient's   Gleditsch & Ward (2001) 
  capitals     
Common 
Language 
Dummy variable, 1 if donor and recipient 
have the same official language 
 




Polity   Polity 2 indicator from the Polity IV project  Marshall & Jaggers (2005) 
Former colony   Dummy variable = 1 if recipient was once 
donor’s colony  
Correlates of War 
2 Project (2008)  
Hazard mortality  GIS-data on mortality risk from natural 
hazards. Country means (0-10). (own 
calculations) 
Dilley et al. (2005) 
Rule of 
Law  
Perception of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  regulations that permit and promote private    
  sector development.     
Corruption 
control  
Perception of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as influence of elites. 
  
Affinity index  Extended Gartzke index on voting patterns   Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009) 
  in the UN General Assembly. Takes a value 
between -1 (donor and recipient never voted 
the same and 1 donor and recipient always 




Total value of bilateral imports from donor 
country 
Comtrade (2007) 
Oil dummy  Dummy variable = 1if  recipient oil exports 
exceeds 1/3 of total exports (own 
calculations) 
World Bank (2008),  
World Development Indicators 
Low Rule of 
Law 
Dummy variable = 1 if Rule of Law index 
< 0  (own calculations) 
World Bank (2008),  
World Development Indicators 
High corruption  Dummy variable =1 if Corruption control 
Index<0 (own calculations) 
World Bank (2008),  






                                                 
1 See also Nancy & Yontcheva (2006) 
2 For example, maintaining post-disaster recovery teams, specially trained water purification or K-9 units.  
3 Note that we do not investigate whether NGOs are indeed stronger engaged in countries with weak institutions. For a 
detailed analysis of NGO’s aid allocation behavior, see Koch, et al. (2009). 
4 One could also argue that the strategic nature of this relation results from the necessity to prevent migration flows 
from the affected country to the neighboring donor country. 
5 Including NGOs into the sample does not change the results. 
6 The disasters are (figures in parentheses indicate the number of emergency contributions): Drought (106), earthquake 
(346), epidemic (3), extreme temperature (3), flood (452), Insect infestation (3), landslides (15), volcano (21), 
wave/surge (209), wild fires (6), and wind storms (177). 
7 Similar to the work by Fink & Redaelli (2009) we include both magnitude variables at the same time in all our 
specifications. The number of fatalities or affected taken on their own sometimes deliver an incomplete picture of the 
situation. For example, volcanic eruptions in 2002 in Ecuador affected about 128,150 people but did not result in any 
direct fatalities. The correlation between the number of fatalities and the number affected is very low (0.033). 
8 We also ran regressions on specifications including a variable for shared religious beliefs between the donor and the 
recipient. However, the coefficient did not appear to be significantly different from zero. 
9 A number of empirical studies including Koch et al. (2009), Fink and Redaelli (2009) also apply a Tobit estimator. 
Given the nature of the dependent variables in the second stage the application of Tobit would not be appropriate in our 
case. 





 Referees’ Appendix 
 
This appendix includes additional results which are not presented in the manuscript. These results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
 
Figure R 1 is a graphical illustration of the GIS-data used to construct the variable Hazard mortality 
which is based on the work by Dilley et al. (2005). 
 
 
Table R 1 presents the first stage of the Heckman estimates presented in Tables 4 & 5. 
 
 
Tables R 2 and R 3 summarize the estimation results at the gate-keeping stage for OECD and non-
OECD countries (Table 6), respectively. 
 
 
Tables R 4, R 5, R 6 and R 7 present the complete estimation results of table 6 (channel and type 






















































































Table R.1. Heckman First Stage results for Table 4 & 5 
Pr(aid=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   0.136***  0.082***  0.082***  0.137***  0.169***  0.129***  0.080***  0.081***   0.090***  0.089*** 
  (0.029)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.029)   (0.036)   (0.029)   (0.026)   (0.027)    (0.034)  (0.034) 
Ln(Affected)  0.025   -0.005   -0.006   0.032   0.017   0.029   -0.007   -0.010    -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.028)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.025)   (0.014)   (0.013)    (0.016)  (0.016) 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.090   -0.051   -0.058   -0.082   -0.322***  -0.106*   -0.077   -0.085    -0.313***  -0.309*** 
  (0.055)   (0.068)   (0.072)   (0.061)   (0.065)   (0.060)   (0.065)   (0.066)    (0.080)  (0.084) 
Ln(Population)  -0.177***  -0.134***  -0.137***  -0.187***  -0.404***  -0.184***  -0.144***  -0.142***   -0.356***  -0.356*** 
  (0.035)   (0.029)   (0.028)   (0.041)   (0.054)   (0.033)   (0.028)   (0.028)    (0.047)  (0.044) 
Pop dens.   0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.000   -0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000    0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Distance   -0.064***  -0.053***  -0.054***  -0.073***  -0.042***  -0.062***  -0.053***  -0.053***   -0.029***  -0.029*** 
  (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.007)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
Common language  0.216**   0.038   0.034   0.308***  0.078   0.234**   0.041   0.029    -0.080  -0.098 
  (0.103)   (0.096)   (0.095)   (0.112)   (0.115)   (0.105)   (0.097)   (0.095)    (0.107)  (0.104) 
Polity  0.112***      0.078***  0.085***  0.117***         
  (0.020)       (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.020)          
Former colony  0.851***  0.896***  0.895***  0.589***  0.139   0.864***  0.901***  0.899***   0.154  0.145 
  (0.126)   (0.159)   (0.160)   (0.149)   (0.148)   (0.126)   (0.164)   (0.160)    (0.135)  (0.134) 
Hazard mortality  0.018   0.029   0.031*   0.030   0.043*   0.022   0.035*   0.034**    0.059***  0.055** 
  (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.020)   (0.024)   (0.019)   (0.018)   (0.017)    (0.022)  (0.021) 
Rule of Law    -0.149*                  
    (0.090)                  
Corruption      -0.132                
Control      (0.091)                
Affinity index         -1.460***             
        (0.165)              
Imports from donor          0.283***        0.274***  0.305*** 
          (0.020)         (0.039)  (0.047) 
Oil dummy             0.292*   -0.376**   -0.303       
            (0.172)   (0.176)   (0.201)       
Low Rule of Law               0.143     0.207   
              (0.100)     (0.154)   
Oil dummy X              0.534**        
Low Rule of Law              (0.239)        
High corruption                 0.122      0.395** 
                (0.151)      (0.168) 
Oil dummy X                0.480*       
High corruption                (0.255)       
Imports from donor X                  -0.005   
    Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.035)   
Imports from donor X                    -0.039 
     High corruption
 a                    (0.046) 
Constant  0.331   1.076   1.181   1.895**   5.023***  0.416   1.379*   1.457*    5.548***  5.385*** 
  (0.748)   (0.761)   (0.790)   (0.860)   (0.953)   (0.782)   (0.716)   (0.771)    (0.964)  (0.996) 
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  24241   25817   25817   23388   24241   24241   25817   25817    25817  25817 
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
aid, a dummy that switches to 1 if a contribution was made. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in 









Table R.2. First Stage results for Table 6 – Gate keeping stage OECD countries 
Pr(aid=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   0.151***  0.057   0.058   0.140***  0.169***  0.145***  0.055   0.055   0.065   0.065   
  (0.033)   (0.037)   (0.037)   (0.033)   (0.037)   (0.031)   (0.035)   (0.035)   (0.041)   (0.041)   
Ln(Affected)  0.029   0.010   0.009   0.031   0.026   0.033   0.008   0.006   0.009   0.007   
  (0.034)   (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.034)   (0.037)   (0.030)   (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.022)   (0.021)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.037   -0.036   -0.048   -0.011   -0.221***  -0.046   -0.066   -0.068   -0.199**   -0.193**   
  (0.070)   (0.082)   (0.085)   (0.076)   (0.074)   (0.074)   (0.078)   (0.077)   (0.090)   (0.091)   
Ln(Population)  -0.217***  -0.146***  -0.150***  -0.220***  -0.394***  -0.224***  -0.162***  -0.162***  -0.289***  -0.302***  
  (0.045)   (0.040)   (0.040)   (0.046)   (0.065)   (0.043)   (0.039)   (0.040)   (0.058)   (0.056)   
Pop dens.   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
  (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   -0.055***  -0.052***  -0.053***  -0.063***  -0.044***  -0.051***  -0.050***  -0.050***  -0.043***  -0.041***  
  (0.016)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
Common language  0.346**   0.411***  0.397***  0.321**   0.154   0.367**   0.438***  0.413***  0.258*   0.215   
  (0.150)   (0.147)   (0.146)   (0.148)   (0.145)   (0.148)   (0.153)   (0.151)   (0.156)   (0.152)   
Polity  -0.017       -0.035*   -0.033   -0.009          
  (0.021)       (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022)          
Former colony  0.245**   0.160   0.162   0.136   -0.044   0.257**   0.172   0.169   -0.097   -0.112   
  (0.119)   (0.144)   (0.144)   (0.132)   (0.127)   (0.117)   (0.144)   (0.143)   (0.159)   (0.152)   
Hazard   0.019   0.062**   0.066**   0.017   0.025   0.023   0.069**   0.068**   0.076**   0.070**   
mortality  (0.022)   (0.029)   (0.028)   (0.023)   (0.023)   (0.022)   (0.028)   (0.027)   > (0.032)   (0.030)   
Rule of Law    -0.174                  
    (0.137)                  
Corruption      -0.142                
Control      (0.134)                
Affinity index         -0.948***            
        (0.221)              
Imports from           0.185***       0.138***  0.197***  
donor          (0.026)         (0.049)   (0.054)   
Oil dummy             0.268   -0.807***  -0.716**     
            (0.243)   (0.310)   (0.331)      
Low Rule of               0.167     0.216    
Law              (0.170)     (0.260)    
Oil dummy X              1.119***      
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.420)        
High corruption                0.194     0.621**   
                (0.202)     (0.253)   
Oil dummy X                1.032**     
High corruption
 a                (0.427)      
Imports from donor X                 0.015    
    Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.041)    
Imports from donor X                   -0.046   
     High corruption
 a                    (0.052)   
Constant  2.487***  1.926**   2.083**   3.303***  6.147***  2.464***  2.329***  2.329**   4.833***  4.615***  
  (0.889)   (0.930)   (0.943)   (0.939)   (1.078)   (0.908)   (0.900)   (0.934)   (1.128)   (1.116)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2                     
N  3786   4155   4155   3697   3786   3786   4155   4155   4155   4155   
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
aid, a dummy that switches to 1 if a contribution was made. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in 
accordance with Norton et al. (2004). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 
 
  
Table R.3. First Stage results for Table 6 – Gate keeping stage Non-OECD countries 
Pr(aid=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   0.155***  0.132***  0.132***  0.156***  0.180***  0.151***  0.130***  0.131***  0.135***  0.134***  
  (0.048)   (0.037)   (0.037)   (0.049)   (0.051)   (0.053)   (0.036)   (0.037)   (0.039)   (0.040)   
Ln(Affected)  0.067*   -0.002   -0.002   0.069*   0.057   0.068*   -0.006   -0.009   0.001   -0.001   
  (0.039)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.041)   (0.040)   (0.039)   (0.019)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.018)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  -0.085   -0.117   -0.118   -0.092   -0.222**   -0.099   -0.150   -0.162   -0.283***  -0.292**  
  (0.105)   (0.111)   (0.118)   (0.105)   (0.104)   (0.104)   (0.104)   (0.107)   (0.108)   (0.116)   
Ln(Population)  -0.250***  -0.190*** -0.193*** -0.254*** -0.370*** -0.253*** -0.205*** -0.203*** -0.332*** -0.328*** 
  (0.067)   (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.069)   (0.079)   (0.065)   (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.056)   (0.054)   
Pop dens.   -0.000   0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   -0.110***  -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.113*** -0.089*** -0.110*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
  (0.014)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.015)   (0.012)   (0.015)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009)   
Common language  0.403**   -0.016   -0.019   0.453***  0.318*   0.410**   -0.024   -0.034   -0.078   -0.092   
  (0.161)   (0.115)   (0.114)   (0.168)   (0.170)   (0.164)   (0.110)   (0.111)   (0.120)   (0.119)   
Polity  0.005       -0.001   0.011   0.009          
  (0.021)       (0.020)   (0.022)   (0.019)          
Hazard   0.003   -0.005   -0.003   0.007   0.018   0.005   0.003   0.002   0.017   0.015   
mortality  (0.026)   (0.022)   (0.023)   (0.027)   (0.030)   (0.027)   (0.023)   (0.022)   (0.024)   (0.024)   
Rule of Law    -0.175*                 
    (0.105)                  
Corruption      -0.170                
Control      (0.120)                
Affinity index         -0.625***            
        (0.239)              
Imports from           0.183***       0.213***  0.243***  
donor          (0.028)         (0.043)   (0.060)   
Oil dummy             0.126   -0.360*   -0.292      
            (0.208)   (0.189)   (0.215)      
Low Rule of               0.145     0.242    
Law              (0.128)     (0.163)    
Oil dummy X              0.489**       
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.246)        
High corruption                0.096     0.300*   
                (0.194)     (0.172)   
Oil dummy X                0.457*      
High corruption
 a                (0.268)      
Imports from donor X                  -0.039    
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.040)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.067   
High corruption
 a                    (0.058)   
Constant  1.099   1.808   1.874   1.833   3.566***  1.182   2.287**   2.416**   4.588***  4.549***  
  (1.270)   (1.194)   (1.251)   (1.316)   (1.368)   (1.282)   (1.084)   (1.165)   (1.248)   (1.305)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2                     
N  19990   21197   21197   19244   19990   19990   21197   21197   21197   21197   
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
aid, a dummy that switches to 1 if a contribution was made. 
a Coefficients and standard errors are calculated in 






Table R.4. Second stage results for Table 6 – Channel stage OECD countries 
Pr(bilateral=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.113***  -0.105**   -0.107**  -0.112***  -0.078*   -0.068   -0.120**  -0.125***  -0.084   -0.090*   
  (0.043)   (0.050)   (0.050)   (0.042)   (0.043)   (0.045)   (0.049)   (0.048)   (0.053)   (0.052)   
Ln(Affected)  -0.079**   0.016   0.025   -0.080**  -0.102*** -0.102***  0.029   0.040*   0.019   0.029   
  (0.035)   (0.024)   (0.025)   (0.033)   (0.027)   (0.028)   (0.026)   (0.024)   (0.027)   (0.024)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.330***  0.178   0.236*   0.329***  0.050   0.368***  0.258**   0.304**   0.021   0.105   
  (0.108)   (0.128)   (0.135)   (0.107)   (0.112)   (0.113)   (0.127)   (0.131)   (0.129)   (0.134)   
Ln(Population)  0.170***  0.113**   0.111*   0.153**   -0.126*   0.186***  0.088*   0.071   -0.138   -0.142*   
  (0.062)   (0.053)   (0.057)   (0.060)   (0.071)   (0.060)   (0.049)   (0.052)   (0.089)   (0.075)   
Pop dens.   -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*   -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   -0.063*** -0.081*** -0.084*** -0.066***  -0.051**  -0.080*** -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.069*** 
  (0.022)   (0.021)   (0.022)   (0.023)   (0.023)   (0.023)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.023)   (0.023)   
Common language  1.136***  0.546*   0.556*   1.123***  0.855***  1.034***  0.756**   0.805**   0.226   0.284   
  (0.340)   (0.330)   (0.333)   (0.333)   (0.331)   (0.354)   (0.329)   (0.333)   (0.333)   (0.312)   
Polity  -0.015       -0.025   -0.043   -0.030          
  (0.049)       (0.050)   (0.044)   (0.052)          
Former colony  0.474*   0.333   0.336   0.452   0.208   0.445   0.321   0.326   0.007   0.017   
  (0.286)   (0.335)   (0.331)   (0.294)   (0.345)   (0.296)   (0.334)   (0.330)   (0.388)   (0.387)   
Hazard   0.019   -0.039   -0.046   0.019   0.008   -0.009   -0.053   -0.048   -0.056   -0.059   
mortality  (0.032)   (0.035)   (0.037)   (0.032)   (0.033)   (0.035)   (0.038)   (0.038)   (0.041)   (0.040)   
Rule of Law    0.441**                 
    (0.220)                  
Corruption      0.226                
Control      (0.266)                
Affinity index         -0.359              
        (0.360)              
Imports from           0.277***       0.345***  0.341***  
donor          (0.045)         (0.116)   (0.102)   
Oil dummy             -0.815*** -7.803*** -8.025***    
            (0.247)   (0.269)   (0.295)      
Low Rule of               -0.470*    0.282    
Law              (0.261)     (0.604)    
Oil dummy X              7.777        
Low Rule of Law
 a              (.)        
High corruption                -0.169     0.934*   
                (0.311)     (0.560)   
Oil dummy X                7.894      
High corruption
 a                (.)      
Imports from donor X                  -0.162    
    Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.110)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.132   
     High corruption
 a                    (0.105)   
Constant  -4.737*** -4.125*** -4.670***  -4.103**   1.320   -4.494*** -4.278*** -4.634***  -0.351   -1.418   
  (1.578)   (1.422)   (1.444)   (1.634)   (1.775)   (1.626)   (1.330)   (1.466)   (1.615)   (1.814)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2                     
N  598   748   748   577   598   598   748   748   748   748   
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
bilateral, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. 
aCoefficients and standard errors are calculated in 




Table R.5. Second stage results for Table 6 – Channel stage Non-OECD countries 
Pr(bilateral=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.378***  -0.051   -0.052   -0.381*** -0.323*** -0.353***  -0.088   -0.133**   -0.028   -0.049   
  (0.132)   (0.048)   (0.047)   (0.134)   (0.110)   (0.096)   (0.054)   (0.060)   (0.045)   (0.052)   
Ln(Affected)  0.140**   -0.008   -0.008   0.137**   0.129***  0.177***  0.021   0.042   -0.013   0.005   
  (0.055)   (0.033)   (0.033)   (0.054)   (0.050)   (0.048)   (0.028)   (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.028)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.126   -0.357   -0.403   0.126   -0.024   0.993**   -0.146   -0.236   -0.205   -0.340   
  (0.190)   (0.257)   (0.262)   (0.189)   (0.189)   (0.386)   (0.167)   (0.210)   (0.250)   (0.310)   
Ln(Population)  0.077   0.035   0.053   0.094   -0.145   0.300**   0.095   0.031   0.102   -0.012   
  (0.127)   (0.088)   (0.089)   (0.128)   (0.120)   (0.139)   (0.085)   (0.091)   (0.144)   (0.144)   
Pop dens.   -0.001   -0.001**   -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.001   -0.001*   
  (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   -0.031   -0.092*** -0.094***  -0.029   -0.015   -0.024   -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.089*** 
  (0.033)   (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.033)   (0.042)   (0.040)   (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.019)   (0.019)   
Common language  0.341   0.298   0.355   0.268   0.108   -0.105   0.329   0.493   0.333   0.373   
  (0.435)   (0.418)   (0.399)   (0.420)   (0.438)   (0.430)   (0.436)   (0.449)   (0.410)   (0.410)   
Polity  -0.297***     -0.283*** -0.299*** -0.426***        
  (0.092)       (0.091)   (0.099)   (0.130)          
Hazard   -0.012   0.083   0.081   -0.005   0.022   -0.097*   0.051   0.085   0.007   0.081   
mortality  (0.063)   (0.056)   (0.057)   (0.060)   (0.056)   (0.055)   (0.048)   (0.056)   (0.060)   (0.066)   
Rule of Law    0.576*                  
    (0.304)                  
Corruption      0.769**               
Control      (0.342)                
Affinity index         0.574              
        (0.456)              
Imports from           0.308**        0.736***  0.504**   
donor          (0.147)         (0.198)   (0.196)   
Oil dummy             -2.671*** -1.723*** -2.911***    
            (0.662)   (0.424)   (0.635)      
Low Rule of               -0.934*    -0.155    
Law              (0.530)     (0.777)    
Oil dummy X              1.070**       
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.500)        
High corruption                -1.173***   0.261   
                (0.445)     (0.702)   
Oil dummy X                2.006***    
High corruption
 a                (0.687)      
Imports from donor X                  -0.772***  
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.202)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.517*** 
High corruption
 a                    (0.194)   
Constant  -0.185   2.494   2.572   -1.063   4.021   -8.232**   0.479   1.873   0.454   2.219   
  (2.826)   (2.684)   (2.679)   (2.872)   (2.842)   (3.936)   (2.009)   (2.607)   (3.711)   (4.057)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2                     
N  224   352   352   224   224   224   352   352   352   352   
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
bilateral, a dummy that switches to 1 if the aid flow was bilateral. 
aCoefficients and standard errors are calculated in 









 Table R.6. Second stage results for Table 6 – Type stage OECD countries 
Pr(cash=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.079**   -0.080*   -0.081*   -0.081*   -0.060   -0.074*   -0.089*   -0.098**   -0.064   -0.072   
  (0.038)   (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.044)   (0.039)   (0.043)   (0.048)   (0.048)   (0.049)   (0.048)   
Ln(Affected)  0.023   0.026   0.032*   0.033   0.017   0.019   0.028   0.043**   0.022   0.034*   
  (0.032)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.032)   (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.020)   (0.019)   (0.020)   (0.018)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.193**   -0.045   -0.001   0.207**   0.075   0.195**   -0.040   0.009   -0.187   -0.104   
  (0.089)   (0.118)   (0.125)   (0.085)   (0.095)   (0.090)   (0.122)   (0.128)   (0.132)   (0.131)   
Ln(Population)  0.107*   0.106**   0.108**   0.070   -0.010   0.109*   0.106**   0.093*   -0.034   -0.032   
  (0.060)   (0.053)   (0.054)   (0.064)   (0.070)   (0.059)   (0.052)   (0.054)   (0.077)   (0.072)   
Pop dens.   -0.001***  -0.001**   -0.000*   -0.001**   -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001**   -0.000   -0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   0.024   0.006   0.003   0.002   0.034*   0.023   0.011   0.010   0.018   0.014   
  (0.019)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.021)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.018)   (0.018)   
Common language  0.749***  0.455**   0.464**   0.674***  0.638***  0.730***  0.513**   0.581**   0.265   0.306   
  (0.204)   (0.223)   (0.227)   (0.209)   (0.201)   (0.210)   (0.221)   (0.228)   (0.217)   (0.218)   
Polity  0.068*       0.030   0.059   0.066          
  (0.041)       (0.039)   (0.037)   (0.041)          
Former colony  0.033   0.144   0.156   -0.125   -0.108   0.029   0.121   0.146   -0.090   -0.042   
  (0.269)   (0.242)   (0.240)   (0.272)   (0.277)   (0.269)   (0.239)   (0.236)   (0.256)   (0.251)   
Hazard   0.031   -0.029   -0.033   0.016   0.024   0.028   -0.035   -0.027   -0.042   -0.037   
mortality  (0.034)   (0.028)   (0.028)   (0.034)   (0.035)   (0.036)   (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.029)   
Rule of Law    0.294*                  
    (0.153)                  
Corruption      0.186                
Control      (0.192)                
Affinity index         -1.167***            
        (0.283)              
Imports from           0.107***       0.192***  0.170**   
donor          (0.034)         (0.074)   (0.081)   
Oil dummy             -0.109   -5.940*** -6.300***    
            (0.240)   (0.272)   (0.260)      
Low Rule of               -0.553***   -0.073    
Law              (0.213)     (0.422)    
Oil dummy X              6.070        
Low Rule of Law
 a              (.)        
High corruption                -0.305     0.225   
                (0.264)     (0.483)   
Oil dummy X                6.377      
High corruption
 a                (.)      
Imports from donor X                  -0.084    
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.070)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.047   
High corruption
 a                    (0.078)   
Constant  -5.734*** -3.695*** -4.105*** -4.217***  -3.394**  -5.685*** -3.539*** -3.962***  -1.103   -1.918   
  (1.479)   (1.249)   (1.276)   (1.636)   (1.636)   (1.480)   (1.248)   (1.336)   (1.523)   (1.565)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2                     
N  597   747   747   576   597   597   747   747   747   747   
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
cash, a dummy that switches to 1 if the bilateral aid contribution was cash. 
aCoefficients and standard errors are 








Table R.7. Second stage results for Table 6 – Type stage OECD countries 
Pr(cash=1|X)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Ln(Fatalities)   -0.105   -0.041   -0.050   -0.113   -0.071   -0.044   -0.087   -0.111**   -0.046   -0.059   
  (0.065)   (0.053)   (0.049)   (0.071)   (0.070)   (0.071)   (0.054)   (0.056)   (0.051)   (0.056)   
Ln(Affected)  0.087   -0.080*** -0.072***  0.090   0.075   0.054   -0.032   -0.026   -0.060*** -0.047**  
  (0.077)   (0.026)   (0.024)   (0.081)   (0.077)   (0.063)   (0.024)   (0.026)   (0.022)   (0.023)   
Ln(GDP p.c.)  0.069   -0.461*** -0.476***  0.067   -0.031   0.239   -0.164   -0.338**   -0.193   -0.321**  
  (0.172)   (0.133)   (0.138)   (0.182)   (0.188)   (0.175)   (0.126)   (0.163)   (0.129)   (0.142)   
Ln(Population)  -0.192   -0.091   -0.062   -0.186   -0.291*   -0.143   -0.036   -0.088   0.001   -0.044   
  (0.137)   (0.102)   (0.102)   (0.142)   (0.156)   (0.108)   (0.102)   (0.114)   (0.111)   (0.139)   
Pop dens.   -0.002   -0.000   0.000   -0.002   -0.003   -0.004***  -0.001*   -0.001   -0.000   -0.000   
  (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Distance   0.069**   -0.015   -0.019   0.078***  0.077***  0.061**   -0.012   -0.008   -0.025   -0.021   
  (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.028)   (0.027)   (0.029)   (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.030)   (0.031)   
Common language  -0.865**  -1.381*** -1.239**  -0.925**  -0.871**  -1.034**  -1.281**  -1.247**  -1.389*** -1.307**  
  (0.393)   (0.501)   (0.529)   (0.414)   (0.398)   (0.433)   (0.502)   (0.546)   (0.490)   (0.518)   
Polity  -0.072       -0.062   -0.068   -0.105          
  (0.066)       (0.067)   (0.070)   (0.068)          
Hazard   0.048   0.068**   0.066**   0.051   0.064   0.025   0.026   0.063*   0.018   0.050   
mortality  (0.054)   (0.028)   (0.028)   (0.054)   (0.053)   (0.049)   (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.031)   (0.034)   
Rule of Law    0.894***                
    (0.250)                  
Corruption      0.992***              
Control      (0.305)                
Affinity index         0.857*              
        (0.443)              
Imports from           0.102*         0.008   0.160   
donor          (0.059)         (0.095)   (0.137)   
Oil dummy             -1.532*** -1.028**  -1.862***    
            (0.389)   (0.473)   (0.471)      
Low Rule of               -0.491     -0.461    
Law              (0.391)     (0.511)    
Oil dummy X              0.103        
Low Rule of Law
 a              (0.585)        
High corruption                -1.001***   -0.204   
                (0.327)     (0.595)   
Oil dummy X                0.905      
High corruption
 a                (0.656)      
Imports from donor X                  -0.075    
Low Rule of Law
 a                  (0.100)    
Imports from donor X                    -0.231*   
High corruption
 a                    (0.132)   
Constant  -4.536   5.251**   4.774**   -5.508   -2.463   -5.485   1.885   3.995   1.874   2.764   
  (.)   (2.371)   (2.269)   (.)   (.)   (.)   (2.143)   (2.814)   (2.279)   (2.866)   
Disaster FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2                     
N  226   357   357   226   226   226   357   357   357   357   
Notes: Coefficients reported; Standard errors (in parentheses) are clusters at country-year-level. Dependent variable is 
cash, a dummy that switches to 1 if the bilateral aid contribution was cash. 
aCoefficients and standard errors are 
calculated in accordance with Norton et al. (2004). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, 
respectively. 
 